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When building large specifications from requirements, the structure of the specification becomes 
a central problem: the specification language should allow a decomposition that closely reflects 
the structure of requirements. In this paper, we propose a decomposition into defaults (general 
rules) and exceptions to these general rules that fits the requirements found in some application 
domains. It is complementary, and builds upon, the modular decomposition proposed by the 
algebraic specification school. Its definition is based on abstract model theorv. leading to the 
definition of default institutions. 
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1. Introduction 
Large specifications need structure to be manageable. This structure is key to 
their readability, writability, reusability, and traceability to requirements. The alge- 
braic specification school proposes a strong structuring construct, importation, where 
an existing specification can be enriched, but not be modified. While developing 
case studies [14,15], we discovered that this structure is often, but not always, 
adequate: 
l It might not match the organization found in requirements, making it difficult 
to relate specifications to the original requirements. 
l It might not reflect the construction process followed by the specifier, leading 
to difficulties in explaining the specification, and sometimes to large 
modifications in the specification in response to a small change in requirements. 
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l It might hinder reuse, since existing specifications often have to be slightly 
adapted. 
We propose here a complementary structure that allows partial reuse of existing 
specification modules: the “default” module is used as a template that can be 
tailored by introducing specific exceptions to suit the needs of the application at 
hand. To give a meaning to such a combination, we select the models of the exception 
that are as close as possible to the models of the default. The use of models preserves 
the level of abstraction found in algebraic specifications: specially, logically 
equivalent specifications are not distinguished. 
This composition is nonmonotonic: by adding exceptions, we may have to retract 
defaults. Note that nonmonotonicity is already present in the initial approach to 
algebraic specifications: in the initial model, all terms are distinguished by default, 
and by adding equalities we may have to retract some of these default inequalities. 
In the same way that the initial approach can be parameterized by the logic used 
and the morphisms between models (that are used to select the initial model) [24], 
our proposal can be parameterized by the logic and the closeness relation between 
models, leading us to define default institutions. 
To allow the reader to become acquainted progressively with the generality of 
default institutions, we start with the simplified case of a default D and an exception 
E, that we note D but E. A propositional logic is first presented informally (Section 
3.1.1); it is then generalized to a first variant of predicate logic (Section 3.1.2), but 
this variant cannot deal with exceptions on equality. A better variant is thus designed, 
and at the same time we show how it can be abstracted to default institutions 
(Section 3.2.1). Using default institutions, the general case with several defaults is 
then presented in Section 4, under the name of reliability graphs. Sound rules for a 
logic of reliability graphs are presented. 
1.1. Examples of application 
(1) SpeciJication construction: Even when requirements are well understood, the 
construction of a formal specification is incremental, beginning with a sim- 
plified model of the system to be built, while exceptions to this model are 
introduced at a later stage. For instance, in the specification of the Unix 
System V file system, the mv command has a simple, orthogonal definition 
[14, Fig. 51, but some cases (e.g., moving a directory) must produce an error 
message instead. These cases are contradicted by further exceptions (e.g., 
moving a directory onto a file) that must produce more specific error 
messages. 
(2) Requirements elicitation: When integrating requirements from different users, 
contradictions often occur that are solved through the use of a precedence 
between requirements [48]. The present scheme can be used to solve simple 
problems of this type. 
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(3) SpeciJication of domains involving exceptions: 
(a) Grammar: The grammar of most natural languages is presented through 
general rules later contradicted by special cases, and recursively. For 
instance, in French, verbs whose infinitive ends in “er” form their third 
plural of present indicative through the suffix “ent”, but verbs in “eler” 
will use “ellent”, except some that use “Glent”. 
(b) Biological taxonomy: Animals are grouped into classes described by 
prototypical properties, but many subclasses are defined through excep- 
tions to these properties. 
In each case, exceptions could be eliminated in the final specification, at the expense 
of readability, writability, and traceability. 
2. Institutions 
The basic definitions of the algebraic school (who borrowed them from logic and 
algebra) are recalled below, with an emphasis on structuring concepts. 
They are independent of the underlying logic. The usual requirements on this 
logic (called an institution [lo, 241) are introduced as we go along, and will be 
extended in the next section towards default institutions, by adding a closeness 
between interpretations that will be used to combine defaults. In fact, as these 
requirements are rather abstract, most of our efforts will be devoted to their illustra- 
tion on a simple, yet not trivial, variant of first-order logic that has interesting 
properties for the specification and implementation of abstract data types. This 
section first recalls the syntactical and semantical parts of institutions. Institutions 
can then be used to define generic operations on specifications: initiality (or freeness) 
[24], importation, inclusion, and reachability. 
2.1. Syntax: modules 
A specification is a description, or better a modeling of the reality. This description 
uses a language. In fact part of this language is chosen by the user; we say that the 
language is parameterized by a signature, and we denote it by Z(X). 
A presentation is composed of a signature .E and of a class of formulae (called 
its axioms) written in Z(E). 
Example 2.1. Our running example will be surjective multi-sorted first-order logic 
without equality that we abbreviate SFOL. The language of SFOL is formed on 
basis of symbols declared in a signature 1, which contains: 
l S, a set of sorts; 
l 0, a set of operators with functions (Y : 0 + S* giving the sort of their arguments 
and u : 0 -+ S, the sort of their result; 
l P, a set of predicates with CY : P+ S* as above. 
The signature is used to build the usual first-order language. 
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s:nat+nat 
preds . = . : nat x nat 
Fig. 1. Data structure definition of the natural numbers. 
Example 2.2. Our concrete examples (that show the use of our example institution) 
borrow their syntax from LPG [2,3], and their graphical notation from Z [52], 
where a module is represented by a box with a line dividing the signature from the 
axioms. 
The natural numbers are specified in Fig. 1 as an example of a data structure 
definition typical of software specification. (end of 2.2) 
(end of 2.1) 
2.2. Semantics: models 
The semantics of a module will be defined here as its class of models. From an 
abstract point of view, we just need a class of interpretations M(2) for each 
signature, and a satisfaction relation k 5 M(2) x2?(E). 
Example 2.3. An algebra A of a signature 2 gives 
l for each sort s, a set sA (called the carrier of the sort); 
l for each operator symbol J; a function fA from the carriers of the argument 
sorts to the carrier of the result sort; 
l for each predicate symbol p, a relation pa between the carriers of the argument 
sorts. 
In SFOL, we assume that interpretations have an internal signature TEA containing 
2:; an interpretation is thus a pair (EA, A), where A a surjective EA-algebra. This 
definition will later be useful to give a good structure to correspondences (see 
Theorem 2). 
A valuation V is a function that for each variable yields its value, i.e. a member 
of the carrier of its sort. We say that V’-, V, if Vx E X,5\{v}, V’(X) = V(X). 
The evaluation V, is the function that extends V by assigning to each term of 
TZA(X) a value (an element of the carrier of its sort) so that V,(f( t,, . . . , t,)) = 
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.L( VA(h), . . . , V,( t,)) for any operator fE EA. For each valuation, there is exactly 
one evaluation extending it. When no variables are present (X = (3), there is a single 
ground valuation, which is the empty function. The ground evaluation, denoted e,, 
is the corresponding evaluation that gives a value to each (internal) ground term. 
If e, is injective, the algebra is called injective as well; if e, is surjective, the algebra 
is called surjective; if the restriction of e, to the ground terms of the signature 1 is 
surjective, the algebra is called term-generated. Surjective algebras have a special 
importance in computer science, due to their constructive nature [ 11,571. We follow 
this tradition and define interpretations of SFOL as surjective algebras. As the 
signature of the algebra can be larger than the signature of the language, this is not 
a real restriction, since we can always add constants to represent each element (i.e. 
form diagram signature [l]), but it will have its importance when we consider the 
closeness between interpretations. An algebra A satisJies a formula 4 for a valuation 
V, denoted A k v 4, if: 
l A+.p(&,..., t,) iff PA(G(&), . . . , h(L)); 
l AI=v+l~ +2 iff Ak”+, and Ak”&; 
l Ai=” 14, iff A+“+ is false; 
l Al=,tlv, 4 iff AI=“,4 for all V’=“V. 
An algebra A satis$es a formula 4, noted AI= 4, if it satisfies it for all valuations. 
(end of 2.3) 
A model of a presentation P is an interpretation of the signature of P that satisfies 
the axioms of l? The semantics of a presentation P is the class of its models, denoted 
Mod(P). 
Let’s see what happens when the signature varies. The signatures should form a 
category, with morphisms showing variations. A signature morphism m : 2 + 2’ 
should induce a translation function Tr, on the language and an opposite forgetful 
functor .lm on algebras. We say that: 
l A formula 4 E Z’(Z) entails 4’~ Z’(E), denoted 4 I= b’, iff all models of 4 are 
models of 4’. This induces a category of formulae. 
l A presentation P entails a formula C#I E Z(IP), denoted P k 4, if all models of 
P satisfy 4. We also say that C$ is a property of Z? 
l A theory is an entailment-closed class of formulae: 4 E T, 4 k I+!J + $ E T. 
(Theories equipped with inclusion form yet another category.) Specially, the 
properties of a presentation form its closure theory Cl(P). Similarly, the theory 
Cl(2, M) of a model M is the set of its properties: {C#J E Z(E) 1 M k 4). 
We define semantic equivalence # as isomorphism in each of these categories. 
A model M is reJined by another model N, Mm N, if N has more properties: 
Cl(I, M) G Cl(E, N). On the other hand, we have assumed (following the tradition 
of institutions) that interpretations of a given signature form a category. The 
morphisms between interpretations are usually variants of homomorphisms (see 
[24] for examples), but we will see in Definition 1 another definition that suits better 
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our purposes. These morphisms naturally define another preorder, and it is instruc- 
tive to compare the two preorders. The institution is said to be weakly abstract iff 
M-N whenever 3h : A4 + IV. Intuitively, an institution is weakly abstract if our 
logic does not allow us to look at more details of our models than the morphisms do. 
Example 2.4. First-order logic with equality, equipped with isomorphisms, is weakly 
abstract. (end of 2.4) 
Example 2.5. Branching temporal logic with bisimulations [18] is weakly abstract. 
(end of 2.5) 
Example 2.6. SFOL is weakly abstract (see Theorem 3). (end of 2.6) 
2.3. Initial model 
Institutions are used in [24] to define initial models: a model is initial if there is 
a single morphism from it to any other model. Informally, morphisms define an 
order of preference, and we choose the unique minimum (if it exists) as the semantics 
of our specification. In the usual equational institution [17], this model has the 
interesting properties of nojunk and no confusion (see Section 5.4.1). The language 
designer can construct morphisms to select the model according to his taste. For 
instance, in partial algebras, Moller [40] and Reichel [45] choose the least defined 
model. We think that this concept can be improved in two main directions: 
l Requiring the existence of a minimum is too rigid. The language is then restricted 
to Horn clauses, excluding thus disjunction or existential quantification that 
we consider to be important tools for specification. We will therefore work 
with minimal models instead (defined in Section 3.3). 
l Although institutions allow the language designer to choose his criteria for 
minimization, the language u.ser (the specifier) has no choice. Here, we will 
allow the specifier to give an “ideal template”, also called a default. The models 
that are closest to this default will be retained. 
3. Default institutions 
3.1. Examples 
3.1.1. Propositional logic 
We first present the case of classical propositional logic. This allows a simple and 
intuitive exposition of the basic structure of default institutions. 
What should be the meaning of but in this simple setting? Clearly, when no 
conflicts arise between the default and the exception, we should just gather the 
information by a simple conjunction. For instance, given a signature with two 
propositions J for “JR comes at the party” and S for “Sue Ellen comes at the 
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pafiy”, we intuitively understand “JR comes at the party, but not Sue Ellen” as 
JAMS. 
If conflicts arise, we would like to keep as much information from the default as 
possible. For instance, from “Bobby, JR, and Sue Ellen come at parties, but Sue 
Ellen is not coming tonight”, (B A J A S) but (1s) means, intuitively, B A J A 1s. 
To reach the abstraction level usual in algebraic specifications, and to avoid any 
bias given by the concrete syntax of formulae, we would like our formalization to 
be based on models. A Karnaugh table (Fig. 2) can help us to visualize the models: 
in such a table, each entry represents a possible model. 
Fig. 2. Karnaugh table of the models. 
Looking at the table, the models we want are the models of E that are closest to 
a model of D. Here, two such models exist: e, described by B A J A -6 A P (which 
is S away from d, = B A J A S A P) and e2 described by B A J A TS A TP (which is also 
S away from BAJASATP). 
This institution can easily be formalized: Given two models M and N we can 
define the closeness between M and N, denoted d(M, IV), as a pair of sets of 
propositions: 
l the first set contains the propositions that are true in M and false in N; 
l the second set contains the propositions that are false in M and true in N. 
The distances will be compared by componentwise inclusion. Propositional logic 
equipped with this closeness will be called PL. It is equivalent to the propositional 
fragment of the default institutions presented in the sequel. Its strong intuitive 
appeal stems, we think, from the fact that the closeness between models is determined 
by the difference between their elementary facts. Of course, nothing ensures that 
real-world facts will correspond to logical facts (propositions), but it is a reasonable 
starting point. Unlike the usual concept of distance, the closeness used here: 
l is not really symmetrical: d(e,, d,) = (0, {S}), while d(d,, e,) = ({S}, 0). 
l is not totally ordered: for instance d ( dl , d2) = ({P}, 0), while d ( e4, ez) = (0, {J}), 
and these are not comparable by componentwise set inclusion. 
Of course, other closenesses are possible: 
l To ensure symmetry, we could just take the union of the two components of 
the pair, so that for instance d(e,, d,) = {S}. In this case, we consider that 
suppressing or adding a fact amounts to the same change. This closeness is 
proposed in [56]. 
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l To ensure linearity (total ordering), we can consider the size of the sets in 
either of the two proposals above. Among other bad properties, this closeness 
would be sensitive to the duplication of propositions: if we use two propositions 
p and p’ to represent the same information, the weight of this information will 
increase in the closeness. This closeness is proposed in [13]. 
l This last inconvenience can be avoided by using user-defined weights. 
Our study will be parameterized by the logic and by the closeness chosen. This 
flexibility can be used to introduce domain-dependent closenesses favoring for 
instance one proposition over another, according to their contents; but we prefer 
to work in a single default institution, and to obtain this type of preferences by 
other means, as done in Section 4. Algorithms and proof rules can then be devised 
once and for all. 
3.1.2. Predicate logic (circumscription) 
We would like now to introduce variables in our previous proposal (PL). 
A natural idea is to replace the propositions p by p(a,, . . . , a,,), where a,, . . . , a,, 
are elements of the carriers. This leads to the definition of a closeness (called 
FOL= =) where each predicate is mapped to the differences between its extensions 
in the two interpretations: d (M, N) = [p H ( pM\pN, pN\ p,)]. This closeness only 
has a meaning if the carriers of M and N are the same; furthermore, the functions 
should also be the same in the two models. This example shows that a further 
generalization of the concept of distance is needed: the closeness, instead of being 
a total function, might be defined only for some pairs of models (here, models that 
have the same carriers and functions). 
One consequence of this definition is that exceptions on equality cannot be dealt 
with: for instance, if two constants are requested to be equal in the default and 
different in the exception, then some carrier or some function has to be different. 
Even if we convene that equality is not built in, the same problem occurs (this is 
well known in the study of circumscription, see [ZO]). This is rather unfortunate as 
most existing algebraic specifications make heavy use of equality. 
3.1.3. The problem of equality 
In the framework of algebraic specifications, models with different carriers are 
usually compared using homomorphisms. Between two models, there may exist 
several homomorphisms, so that a further generalization will be needed: the closeness 
may depend not only on the models, but also on the way they are compared. We 
will thus replace pairs (M, IV) by morphisms h : M + N that may contain supplemen- 
tary information-typically information about which element in a carrier of one 
model is the counterpart of a given element in the corresponding carrier of the other 
model. Partiality is then represented naturally by the absence of morphisms between 
the two models considered. In the previous example (FOL= =), the morphisms are 
equalities. Given an homomorphism h : A + B, the closeness will thus be generalized 
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to a mapping giving for each predicate p : w, the pair 
({a- E w, [p,(d) and not p,(h(z))], 
(6 E WA [not p,(d) and &h(z))]). 
We are led to compare two homomorphisms by using a third one: h : A + B s 
h’:A’+ B’ iff 3hA:A+A’; Vp: WE P; V~‘E w,: 
l (p,(Z) and not p,(h(Z))) implies (pAf(hA(6)) and not p,(h’(h,(a’)))), 
l (not p,(Z) and p,(h(a’))) implies (not pAf(hA(d)) and pBS(h’(hA(Z)))). 
To simplify notation, we have suppressed the function d, and we use a preorder 
between morphisms directly. In the special case where the default is of the form 
A\p:wtP VX : w; lp(X), we obtain equality circumscription [44]. This ordering intro- 
duces more problems than it solves: 
Example 3.1. Consider the trivial specification D but D. It is intuitively expected 
to be equivalent to D. And indeed, the measure of distance between a model and 
itself using the identity morphism is empty. The definition of h : A -+ B s h’: A’+ B’ 
given above simplifies thus to 3 hA : A + A’, which will select a model where equality 
is minimal. We see thus that the use of a homomorphism in the comparison leads to: 
l minimizing the equality even when nothing in the specification seems to request 
it; 
l considering that some pairs of models might agree strictly better than a model 
with itself. 
In the definition of default institution, we will take care to eliminate this counter- 
intuitive behaviour by requesting that identities are always minimum. (end of 3.1) 
Furthermore, this ordering deals somewhat unexpectedly with elements that are 
not the value of a ground term: 
Example 3.2. it is common knowledge that one seldom wins in games of chance, 
so let D = Vx: person; Twins(x). We are told that Harry played heads and tails 
with an unknown person: E = 3u : person; u # Harry A (wins(u) v wins(Harry)). By 
examining the models of D but E, we can deduce that Harry has lost the game. 
This unexpected answer disappear when we introduce a name for u (by skolemizing 
E). (end of 3.2) 
3.2. Default institutions 
Our examples had a double motivation: 
l to show that the treatment of the examples required several generalizations of 
the concept of distance, and also to show which properties of the distance 
should be preserved; 
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l to show that the treatment of exceptions on equality had to be improved, 
leading to the proposal of SFOL that will be presented in more detail as an 
example of a default institution. 
3.2.1. Morphisms 
Our first problem is thus to relate algebras that may be widely different in nature: 
for instance, natural numbers, strings of bits, counters of an abacus are all algebras 
of Nat. We need therefore a way to relate elements of different nature that play a 
similar role. In fact, classical institutions [lo] already assume morphisms to that end. 
Example 3.3. Let us return to the SFOL example. We use correspondences for the 
internal signature as morphisms between SFOL interpretations. (The term is 
borrowed from [6].) 
Definition 1. Let A and B be two algebras of 2. A correspondence for E between 
A and B is a family of relations, -s, between the carriers of A and B, with the 
following properties: 
(1) compatible with operators: Vf:sl ,..., s,+s~O; a,--,,b ,,..., a,--,b, j 
.L(aI, . . . , an) -JAbI,. . . , h), 
(2) total: VaEs*, 3bEse,, a-,b, 
(3) surjective: Vb E ss, 3a E sA, a -,b. 
Example 3.4. The natural numbers, N, and the natural numbers modulo 3, N/3, are 
algebras of ENat. The following relations are correspondences between them: 
(I) m-1 n iff m modulo 3 is n, 
(2) -2 is the full relation N x N/3. 
The first is included in the second; we also say that the second is stronger, or coarser. 
(end of 3.4) 
Theorem 1. Correspondences form a category for relational composition. 
Theorem 2. The correspondences between two surjective algebras form a complete 
lattice. (end of 3.3) 
3.2.2. Ordering 
The last problem is to effectively compare morphisms (i.e., pairs of models linked 
by indications about which elements play similar roles), in order to give a precise 
meaning to “closest”. To that end, we require a preorder G among morphisms. 
We require that identity morphisms are minima. Consequently, all of them are 
equivalent for the ordering, and we convene to note one among them as 0. 
Let us say that d is an agreement if d = 0. It is wanted that interpretations that 
agree (for instance, isomorphic interpretations) behave similarly in all respects. 
Therefore, we require agreements to form a subcategory Int, of Int such that the 
resulting institution is weakly abstract: this ensures reflexivity, transitivity, and 
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indistinguishability for formulae of the original language. For the same reason, a 
default institution should be O-symmetrical, that is: for each agreement h : A + B 
there is a reverse agreement hR: B + A such that (hR)R = h. Finally, agreements 
should also be transparent with respect to comparison. This property is expressed 
by O-equivalence: for any morphism h : B +C and agreements a:A+B, c:C+D, 
a;h=h=h;c. 
This closes our requirements on default institutions, summarized in Appendix A.1. 
These requirements suggest a method for finding adequate categories: 
(1) start from an abstract category 9; such off-the-shelf categories exist for most 
logics; 
(2) generalize it keeping the structural part only; 
(3) choose the comparison preorder such that d = 0 iff d is a morphism of 9. 
This method has been followed for our example default institutions, except that we 
have found no abstract category for logics without equality on our shelf. 
Example 3.5. In SFOL, the structural part of morphisms relate constants and 
functions, so that we choose to measure the difference between predicate extensions. 
We first introduce a concrete representation for that difference. 
Definition 2. A double correspondence from a correspondence - : A + B to another 
--I: A’+ B’ is a family of relations zg (indexed by sorts) between pairs of correspond- 
ing elements, with the same properties as correspondences: 
(1) compatible with operators: Vf: sl,. . . , s, + s E 0; (a,, b,) z5, (a;, b:), . . . , 
(a,, b,) zs. (4, WJ * (fA(al,. . . , anI, _Mh, . . . , b,)) =s tf.dai, . . . ,a2 
fdb:, . . . , K,)); 
(2) total: Vs E S, V(a, b) E -; 3(a’, b’) E -‘; (a, b) zs (a’, b’); 
(3) surjective: Vs E S, V(a’, b’) E -‘; 3(a, b) E -; (a, b) zs (a’, b’). 
Definition 3. The SFOL preorder on correspondences, noted - G -‘, holds if there 
is a double correspondence = : - + -’ such that any conflict between A and B has 
a corresponding conflict between A’ and B’, i.e. for all (a’, b’) such that (a, b) = 
(a’, b’): 
l p,(a) A lps(b) * pJa’) A lpB4b’); 
l ipA A p,(b) * pAXa’) A pe(b’). 
Theorem 3. If two SFOL interpretations agree, they satisfy the same first-order 
formulae. (end of 3.5) 
3.3. The meaning of but 
The models of D but E are the models of E that are the closest to a model of 
D; the comparison category chosen by the language designer provides the (general- 
ized) distance that gives the meaning of “closest”. 
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We introduce some notations to express this formally. For formulae 0, E E 2, 
we define Mor( E, D) as the morphisms whose domain satisfy E and whose codomain 
satisfy D. 
Definition 4. h is minimal among a set of morphisms S (h E Min(S)) iff: 
l hES; 
l Vh’ES, h’<h j hsh’. 
We abbreviate Min( Mor( E, D)) in Min( E, D), so that we can write: 
Definition5 eI=D but E iff IhEMin(E,D); e=dom(h). 
Informally, a model of D but E is the starting point of a shortest path from E 
to D. 
Example 3.6. The sentence “all men are mortal, but Faust” can be modelled as: 
Vm : man, mortal(m) but lmortal(Faust). 
We expect intuitively that the disagreement between a model A of D and a model 
B of E are the immortal men of B. The smallest such set will only contain Faust, 
so that in all models of D but E all men but Faust will be mortal. 
Many uses of exceptions in linguistics are of this type: a general rule admits a 
number of specific exceptions. 
Let us look in more detail if the informal reasoning above is valid in all our 
example default institutions. 
l In FOL= =, we can derive Vx: man, x # Faust j mortal(x), but we cannot 
derive mortal(John)-assuming John is another constant of type man-unless 
we specify John # Faust. 
l In SFOL, Faust is the unique immortal man, as expected, and we can derive 
mortal(John). (end of 3.6) 
Example 3.7. The sentence “All Mohicans are dead, but one” can be modelled as: 
Vm : Mohican, dead(m) but am’: Mohican, idead( 
Once again, the disagreement will be the Mohicans that are not dead in the model 
of E, and the smallest disagreements are the singletons, but here the models may 
disagree on who is the last surviving Mohican. (end of 3.7) 
Example 3.8. Natural numbers modulo 3 are obtained as in Fig. 3. 
This supplementary law (0 = 3) contradicts the first two axioms of Nat. In SFOL, 
the disagreement is given by the numbers that were different in the model of Nat 
and now become equal. The smallest disagreement is given by the natural numbers 
modulo 3, N/3. Note that this example is plainly unsatisfiable in FOL==. 
(end of 3.8) 
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Fig. 3. Data structure definition of the natural numbers modulo 3. 
4. Reliability graphs 
4.1. DeJinition 
4.1.1. Syntax 
It is often useful to be able to order not only two “sources of information”, as 
with but, but an arbitrary number of them, with an arbitrary precedence relation. 
The same idea is found in [26, 31, 49, 551. To that end we define a reliability graph 
for a given signature X as: 
l a set S of “sources of information” (graphically represented by points); 
l a well-founded partial order < s on S, where the lowest source is considered 
as the most reliable; 
l a function @ from S to formulae, representing the knowledge provided by each 
source. 
If G is the name of the graph, we sometimes denote CD(S) by G,. 
Example 4.1. See Fig. 4. 
animal(x) a 7fly(x) 
_/.../.-.- 
bird(x) + fly(x) 
_\\\_ 
bat(x) = 
ostrich(x) + Ifly 
\ / 
ostrich(x) =+ bird(x) 
bird(x) + animal(x) 
bat(x) =+ animal(x) 
Fig. 4. Example 4.1. 
(end of 4.1) 
flvb) 
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4.1.2. Lexicographic ordering 
The definition of a model of such a graph is the obvious extension of the definition 
of but, where the concept of morphism is replaced by family of morphisms. The 
ordering among families is “lexicographic”: 
More precisely, this definition extends the concept of lexicographic ordering in two 
directions: both the order of “string positions” (sources) and the order of “charac- 
ters” (morphisms) can be partial. When the sources are not ordered at all, the 
ordering of families is the usual ordering of tuples. At the opposite, when the sources 
are linearly ordered, we obtain the usual concept of lexicographic ordering. This 
extended lexicographic ordering can be found in [26,49], among others. 
4.1.3. Semantics 
We simply adapt the definition of but: Mar(G) is defined as {L13e, 4; 
h, : e + d,, d, b Gr}. Min( G) contains the minimal morphisms of Mar(G), i.e. 
{LICE Mar(G) 36’~ Mar(G), p<,L}. 
Definition 6. el= G iff 3LE Min(G); Vs E S; dom(h,) = e. 
4.1.4. Operations on graphs 
It is often useful to create new graphs by combining existing ones. We have 
isolated the following useful operations on graphs: 
l The superposition of G over G’, denoted G/G’, places G above G’, i.e. G is 
deemed less reliable than G’. This operation can be used to integrate new 
information taking precedence. 
l The juxtaposition of G and G’, denoted Gil G’, places G and G’ side by side. 
This operation can be used to integrate new information in a skeptical way. 
l The replacement of a source by a subgraph, G[s:= G’], is a generalization of 
the previous operations: Juxtaposition is obtained by replacing the two nodes 
of a binary graph without precedence, and superposition by replacing the two 
nodes of a binary graph with a precedence link. 
l The single-node operation takes a formula and makes a graph of it. This 
operation will be left implicit. 
l The empty graph operation, 0, is included for theoretical purposes only. 
We also say that a graph H has more edges than G, if sH 2 sG, and the sources 
and formulae are the same. 
These operations extend naturally to families of morphisms. Note that these 
operations take into account the internal structure of graphs: Even if two graphs 
have the same class of models, one may not replace the other as the argument of 
such graphical operators. If we identify isomorphic graphs, we obtain that “1” is 
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associative with identity 8, and “I(” is commutative and associative with identity 0. 
Both are monotonic with respect to “has more edges”. 
For any graph G, the semantics of G, denoted m or ICI, defines a class of 
models, just like a formula. Framed graphs can thus be used in place of formulae: 
for instance, they may be combined by the usual boolean connectives. For the same 
reason, framed graphs may be used inside graphs, allowing a finer treatment of 
precedence. For instance, if we interpret Fig. 5 in the default institution PL, the 
first graph, that we can also note p/(plllp), means just “true”: the upper source 
asserting p is not considered, since more reliable sources have an opinion on matter 
P. The second graph, P/IPII~, is equivalent to p: the upper source serves as an 
arbiter between more reliable sources in case of conflict. 
P I b P ‘P 
Fig. 5. Non-equivalent graphs. 
4.2. Properties 
To express concisely these properties, we assume to use a language L&(X) that 
contains graphs, with the semantics given by Definition 6, but also classical con- 
nectives, with their usual semantics. 
Notations. D and E will denote formulae of L&(E), including formulae of the 
original language 3 or framed graphs. G, G,, and G, will denote graphs. 
First note that our semantics allows the replacement of equivalent formulae: 
Theorem 4. IfDHE, then G[s:= E]#G[s:=D]. 
Our next theorem allows us to add or remove a frame around a single formula, 
or said otherwise, the graph containing a single source with formula 4 has the same 
models as 4: 
Theorem 5. m#D. 
Note that Theorem 5 above would not be valid in [49], where (II HT. 
Our study of but is subsumed by the study of graphs, since but is just a binary graph: 
Theorem 6. ek D but E iReI= D/E. 
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As expected, if a graph has a minimum (most reliable) source, then the models 
of the graph satisfy the formula of that source: 
Theorem 7. G/E != E. 
In a connected institution, Theorem 7 can be further generalized to an arbitrary 
subgraph instead of a single source, stating that by removing the upper part (GJ 
of a graph, we add models: 
Theorem 8. In a connected institution, G2/ G, i= G, . 
When we remove a frame in the bottom of a graph, we obtain a weaker formula: 
Theorem 9. G,/I GZI I= G,/ Gz. 
If a graph is satisfiable, all its formulae are satisfiable as well: 
Theorem 10. If G is satisfiable, each G, is satisjiable. 
If it is possible to satisfy all formulae of a graph at the same time, then the graph 
reduces to a conjunction: 
Theorem 11. If /jsss G, is satisjiable, then G#ASEs G,. 
We can add consequences as exceptions without changing the meaning of a graph, 
provided the institution is smooth: 
Theorem 12. In a smooth institution, if G k E, then G/E # G. 
Disjunction semi-distributes over any graph: 
Theorem 13. /G[s:= (C v D)]lb /G[s:= Cl/v [s:= II]/. 
“Semi” means that equivalence is replaced by entailment; this reflects the fact 
that we are allowed to choose the closest models of C v D. 
The next rule can be paraphrased as follows: assume that we can satisfy the 
left-hand side, namely satisfy E, and be as close as possible to G, within E,, and 
symmetrically. Then we satisfy E, A EZ, and we are as close as possible to both G, 
and G2. 
Theorem 14. IG11E,I~IG2/E21~((G1)IG2)l(E,hE2)1. 
Theorem 15 [26]. If a graph H has more edges than G, then H k G. 
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Derived rules for but are established as corollaries in Appendix B. 
89 
4.3. Application: belief revision 
The setting used in [23] is, we believe, too abstract to deal satisfactorily with this 
problem, since justifications of belief should be taken into account to model human 
reasoning. 
Example 4.2. A classical story, reported in [27], shows this: Assume that I arrive, 
hungry, very late in a little town where I know only two McDo’s p and q may be 
open at this hour. While approaching the town, I meet a guy with a hamburger, 
so that I form the belief p v q. Coming closer, I see the lights of p, so that I now 
believe (p v q) but p, that is p by (W2). When I try to push the door of p, I notice 
that the snackbar is locked and that there is nobody inside. According to Gardenfors’ 
theory, I now believe p but lp, which is lp in the default institution PL. A solution 
of this riddle (but certainly not of the general problem of belief revision) is to use 
our reliability graphs: In the end of the story, our belief state is then the graph 
I(p v q)/p/lpl, which evaluates to lp A q in PL, as expected. (end of 4.2) 
Example 4.3. Another puzzle is due to [53]. Imagine a man who always wears his 
hat when it is raining. Now you are told that it is raining, so that you also believe 
that he has his hat on. Then, looking through the window, you discover that it is 
not raining. When modelling this story, we obtain that ((rain + hat) but rain) but 
Train, which evaluates to Train A hat in PL: so you still believe that the man has 
his hat on, just because you believed it a few seconds before. The cause of the 
problem is clear: we have not recorded the justification for believing hat, so that 
the effect persists even when the justification has disappeared. Using reliability 
graphs, we obtain (rain =+ hat)/rain/lrain, which evaluates to Train, as expected. 
Note that to represent faithfully the story, we should not insert the new data 
according to its temporal ordering but according to its reliability, that is 
(rain + hat))l( ’ / ram Train). For this simple story, the result is the same. 
(end of 4.3) 
5. Related work 
Although the present study was developed to fulfill our needs in structuring 
specifications, it is related to many fields of computer science and logic. The relation 
between these fields has been studied in [4, 5, 20, 25, 39, 431. 
5.1. Nonmonotonic logics 
51.1. Default logic 
Default logic [47] seems an adequate device to model exceptions, since the 
inference rules of this logic include some antecedents, a consequent-as usual-but 
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also justi$cations that must be consistent before the inference rule may be applied. 
This fits with an (often unsound) intuitive meaning of D but E, “accept the 
consequence of D as long as they are consistent with E”. 
This logic has to be used with some care: 
(1) The justifications have to be carefully crafted to allow the right level of 
granularity. To take a trivial example, a default like Vx; p(x) can be translated 
to the normal defaults: 
l Mp(x)/p(x). In this case p(t) will be inferred when consistent, for any term 
t. We will never be able to infer Vx; p(x), even if no exceptions are present. 
l MVx; p(x)/Vx; p(x). In this case we cannot conclude p(t), except when 
no exceptions are present. 
These slightly paradoxical properties come from the fact that default logic is 
defined from a syntactical notion of provability. 
(2) The default theory (even though a normal default theory) may admit incom- 
patible extensions. We prefer a skeptical approach, where a unique meaning 
is given to each specification. 
(3) Some intuitively valid conclusions may be missing. (See Example 5.1 below.) 
(4) Due to nonmonotonicity missing consequences may give rise to intuitively 
invalid consequences. (See Example 5.2 below.) 
(5) A finer translation would require to list explicitly the exceptions in the general 
rule [lo], defeating our initial purpose of concision and readability. 
Example 5.1 (from [16]). We formalize Mary and Peter tend to avoid each other at 
parties, by introducing a predicate p for is at the party. We divide the assertion 
above into two defaults: 
p( Mary) : Mlp( Peter)/lp( Peter). 
p(Peter) : Mlp(Mary)/lp(Mary). 
Assume we know that Peter or Mary is at the party, that is p( Peter) v p( Mary), then 
we can conclude nothing more and, specially, we are unable to conclude the expected 
l(p( Mary) A p(Peter)). (end of 5.1) 
Example 5.2. A popular example is found in [42]: normally non-broken things are 
usable 
: M(usable(x) A lbroken(x))/usable(x). 
You have met a friend with a broken arm, but you don’t remember which one: 
broken(leftarm) v broken(rightarm). 
Since we can assert no formula of the form broken(x), the default can be applied 
in every case and we conclude both usable(leftarm) and usable(rightarm). 
(end of 5.2) 
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5.1.2. Preferential logics 
Shoham, in [51], proposes a nonmonotonic logic parameterized by a preference 
relation: a conclusion is (nonmonotonically) valid if it holds in all most preferred 
models of the antecedents. This allows him to model known systems such as 
subimplication [7] and circumscription [38] (presented below). This proposal is 
studied in [32], which gives complete deduction systems for five families of preferen- 
tial logics. 
This proposal is clearly connected with our work, since for a given default 0, 
the models of D but E can be considered as preferred models of E. In other words, 
in a given default institution, each default D defines a preferential logic. 
5.1.3. Logic of theory change 
The logic of theory change [23] was originally developed to model the human 
process of changing mind, more formally called “belief revision”. In [23], any 
mental state is modelled by a theory of some given logic (9, +) containing classical 
propositional logic. On top of this, Ggrdenfors postulates a function * taking a 
mental state and a sentence, and returning the new mental state obtained by changing 
mind so as to believe the sentence. This setting, we believe, is too abstract to deal 
satisfactorily with the problem of human belief revision, since justifications of belief 
should be taken into account to model human reasoning-reliablity graphs are 
better suited, see Example 4.2. 
The following postulates are considered by Ggrdenfors [23] as minimal rationality 
requirements for belief revision: 
K*l. K * 4 is a theory. 
K*2. 4 E K * 4. 
K”3. K * 4 G Cl(K A 4). 
K*4. If 14 .@ K, then C1( K A 4) E K * (b. 
K*5. K*+=Ziffbl+. 
K”6. If t= 4 @ I/J,, then K * 4 = K * I/I. 
K*7. K * (4 A $)s CI((K * 4) A $). 
K”8. If i$$ (K * 4), then CZ((K * 4) A +)G K * (4 A $). 
As our approach is based on a possible world semantics, these postulates do not 
directly apply; nevertheless we can translate them, be replacing 
l K * #J by K but 4, or equivalently, 1 K/41; 
l ~EK by KI=4; 
l K,s K2 by K,kK,. 
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Some these postulates theorems in approach: 
l K*l need not be valid: the language .Y might be unable to express some 
expressions containing buts. 
l K”2 results from Theorem 7. 
l K”3 results from Theorem 11. 
l K*4 also. 
l K*5 need be valid. There are three possible reasons for this: 
- No model of K is connected to a model of 4. This case can be eliminated 
by requiring connectedness. 
_ There is an infinite regression of morphisms from C$ to K, so that none is 
minimal. This case can be eliminated by requiring smoothness. 
- K is unsatisfiable. 
l K*6 is valid, since + C$ e I+!J yields 4!=i$. 
l K*7 results from Theorem 14. 
l K*8 is not valid, even in a simple and intuitive default institution like PL. 
In summary, the postulates of [23] seem somewhat too strong. The literature 
contains many proposals for relaxing them (see [21]). 
The following differences are important however: 
l Gardenfors [23] operates on theories: One negative consequence is that no 
counterfactual logic can be built by the Ramsey test on top of revision. We 
operate more classically on possible worlds, so that this problem does not arise. 
l Gardenfors [23] assumes that the criteria for revision depend only, but also 
arbitrarily, on the knowledge under revision. In our setting, the criteria for 
revision depend on the underlying models, and have thus to behave more 
regularly. The axiom Or1 reflects this regularity. On the other hand, this 
regularity might be exaggerated for modelling human belief revision (even the 
weaker assumptions of [23] are too restrictive (see Example 4.2)). For this 
purpose, we suggest to use the more flexible reliability graphs (Section 4). 
l Gardenfors [23] assumes that revision never introduces inconsistency (axiom 
K”5). Although desirable, this assumption is rarely satisfied by example institu- 
tions; among others, circumscription (or FOL==) does not satisfy it. 
5.1.4. Circumscription 
Informally, circumscription is a syntactic expression that should express that the 
extension of predicates is minimal. 
Predicate circumscription 
The earliest variant of circumscription is introduced in [37]. If T is a first-order 
formula, its predicate circumscription is defined as the infinite set of formulae 
Circum,( T, P) containing T and all instances of 
T[P’] AVX(P’(X) + P(x)) + Vx(P(x) + P’(x)) 
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where the predicates of P’ are replaced by arbitrary first-order formulae. Deduction 
from circumscription (either this variant or most of the following) is not trivial, 
since it involves guessing “good” formulae to replace P’. This variant was abandoned 
because: 
l all predicates of the signature have to be minimized, hampering thus the use 
of defined predicates (for instance, defining Q @ 1 P will prevent any minimiz- 
ation of P nor Q); 
l using a first-order scheme leads to incompleteness (see the example of [33], 
reproduced in [41]). 
Variable circumscription 
To allow some predicates to vary while others are being minimized, a simple 
modification is sufficient: Circum,( T, P, , 2) (where P, c P and Z G 0 u P) is defined 
as T and all replacements of Pi and Z’ in 
T[P;,Z’/P,,Z]AVX(P;(X) + P,(x)) + Vx(P,(x) + P;(x)). 
Second-order circumscription 
This definition can be made more powerful by a using second-order quantification 
that ranges not over first-order formulae but over sets: Circum*( T, P,, Z) is 
T/\VP;,Z’.(T[P:,Z’]r\Vx(P;(x) + P,(x))) j Vx(P,(x) * P:(x)). 
When Z = P\P, , the models of this formula are exactly the models that are minimal 
for the preference ordering on models: As R iff 
l sA = sB, where s is the unique sort; 
l fA =fe for all f e F; 
l paGps for all pE P,. 
This is simply the definition of D but T when D = /j\pCpI Vx.lp(x) in the default 
institution FOL== (see Section 3.1.2). 
Formula circumscription 
Formula circumscription [38] allows the minimization of a given formula E. 
Formally, it is defined as follows: Circumf (T, E, P, , Z) is 
TAVP’.(T[P’,Z’]AVX(E(P’,X) + E(P,,x))) + 
Vx(E(P,,x) + E(P’,x)). 
The intent may seem similar to the intent of D but T, with D = 1E. These approaches 
differ in their treatment of open variables: the open variables of E determine the 
granularity of the minimization, since we minimize the instances of E. On the other 
hand, in D but T, D can be a closed formula, since the granularity is fixed by the 
default institution. We can still model formula circumscription through an indirect 
translation. As indicated in [38], the use of an arbitrary expression E above can be 
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eliminated by introducing a fresh predicate 9 and circumscribing q in T A Vx.q(x) @ 
E(P, x) with P u {q} varying. 
Prioritized circumscription 
Prioritized circumscription [35] is an extension that can be modelled by an 
expression D,/. . */D,/E, with D, = /jptPZ Vx.lp(x). 
Comparison 
We have seen that second-order circumscription (with no functions varying) can 
be modelled by a but in FOL= =. The reverse is also true: D but E can be modelled 
by using four copies of the predicate P, say Pd, P,, Prd, Pde, where the first two 
represent the extension of the predicates in the models d and e, and the last two 
the differences between these two. We minimize thus the last two in 
D[P,IPl A E[P,IPl A Pa, e (P, A 1Pd) A Pde e (Pd A TP,). 
Our definition often avoids coding tricks of circumscription, such as abnormality 
predicates. It also allows one to consider default institutions, such as SFOL, that 
handle exceptions on equality better than FOL= =. For instance, the hypothesis of 
uniqueness of names, often needed in the practical applications of circumscription, 
can be expressed (see Section 5.4.1). 
5.2. ArtiJcial intelligence 
5.2.1. Inheritance networks with exceptions 
The study of inheritance with exceptions for “semantic networks” is mainly 
concerned with the precedence problem, often analysed in graph-theoretic terms 
[8, 9, 29, 541. Our approach, based on logic, has a richer language (that includes 
first-order logic) but automated reasoning is less efficient. 
5.3. Logic programming 
Many recent contributions to this field try to give a decent meaning to negation 
in logic programs. 
5.3.1. Closed world assumption 
This assumption, implicit in the deduction mechanism of Prolog, is often used 
to model nonmonotonic reasoning [46]. This interpretation of a theory E can be 
modelled by D but E, where D contains ip(x) for all p E P. This expression gives 
the same result as the closed world assumption on Horn theories, but gives also 
consistent results for disjunctive theories. 
5.3.2. Perfect models 
The closed world interpretation is not always intuitive and convenient. Abetter- 
even called perfect-class of models is proposed in [43] for ground stratified 
programs. When this stratification is generated by a finite stratification, i.e. by m 
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finite sets of literals (strata) li, the perfect models are the models of lI,/e * */1,/E in 
SFOL. The general case can only be treated by infinite expressions in our formalism. 
5.4. Algebraic theory 
5.4.1. Initial model 
The case of equations (no other predicates, and no logical connectives) has been 
studied in [ 171, where they prefer the initial model, which has the properties of “no 
junk” (surjective) and “no confusion”. 
No confusion 
This last property can be modelled in SFOL by 
D but (Equality(%) A E), 
where D contains AsCs Vx, y : s; x # y, and E is the equational presentation. Note 
that this obviously requires that the equality is not built into the institution, for 
otherwise D would be plainly inconsistent. 
No junk 
The property of “no junk” is formally represented by the constraint of term 
generation, which is equivalent to a second-order induction principle [36]. 
To model this principle in our setting, we use an auxiliary predicate r (for 
“reachable”) that we specify as follows: 
[ 
Vx.lr(x) but//lo VGA r(yi) * U(y)) 
t I 
A Vx.r(x). 
5.5. Object-oriented programming languages 
The philosophical ideas on which our approach is based-structuring by use of 
inheritance and exceptions-are also used in object-oriented programming languages 
using multiple inheritance with exceptions. There are important differences, 
however: 
l For efficiency, the combination of methods is programmed by the user, while 
this combination is based on semantics in our approach. 
l For the same reason, the search for a method often occurs in some sequential 
order, while our approach takes a more skeptical view. 
6. Conclusion 
This article proposes a model-theoretic definition for combining defaults and 
exceptions into reliability graphs, based on the idea of closeness present in the 
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intuitive notion of exception. Our definition is parameterized by the logic used and 
this closeness between models that we call a default institution. One of these default 
institutions, SFOL, deals more satisfactorily with equality than circumscription; it 
is also amenable to a complete characterization in second-order logic, and to 
automated deduction (these topics are treated in [SO]). Defaults institutions can 
also be used to define conditionals (in the style of [34]), update [30], and forgetting 
[28] operators. 
Deduction rules for reliability graphs, valid in any default institution, are presen- 
ted; however, they do not form a complete proof system. Our proposal has been 
designed, through its model-theoretic nature, to blend elegantly with the classical 
structuring concepts proposed by the algebraic school, but this blend has not been 
presented in the present paper. Finally, the practical usefulness of our proposal, 
and the methodological aspects of its use, have yet to be assessed through realistic 
experiments. 
Appendix A. Definitions 
A.l. Default institutions 
Our definition is parameterized by a default institution, which is given by: 
l a category Sign of signatures; 
l a functor Sen : Sign + Sets, giving languages .9(E) linked by translations Tri; 
l a contravariant functor Int : Sign + CatfjP, giving interpretations Znt(2) and 
their morphisms Mar(X), linked by forgetful functors denoted I,; the class of 
interpretations should not be empty; 
l a family of satisfaction relations kn between the interpretations of 2 and its 
formulae; 
l a functor Comp : Sign + Cat”“, such that for each X: 
- the objects of Comp are the morphisms of Int; 
- Comp is a preorder, that is, there is at most one morphism of Comp between 
two objects of Comp; 
- the identities of Mar are initial (minima) in Comp; 
- the morphisms of Mar that are minima in Comp are called agreements; they 
must form a subcategory Znt,; 
- Int, is weakly abstract: 3h : M + NE Int, + Cl(M) c CZ(N); 
- O-symmetry: each agreement h : A4 + N has a reverse agreement hR: N + M 
such that (hR)R= h; 
- O-equivalence: for any morphism h : B + C and agreements a : A+ B and 
c:C+D,a;h=h=h;c. 
Note: Unlike [lo], we do not require the satisfaction condition nor the 
soundness condition (which is ensured by construction). 
When there is a morphism h such that Vh’ E Min({h : M + N}), h s h’, we 
define d( M, N) as h. When d( M, N) = 0, M and N agree. 
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A.2. Graph operations 
The graph G” = G/G’ is defined by: 
(1) S”=Sls,S’. 
(2) l S’ cs,. s, for any s’ E S’ and s E S; 
l consequently, s cs,, s’ is false, for any s’ E S’ and s E S; 
l s, Cs,.s2 iff s,<,s,, for any s,,s,ES; 
,’ I . s; <y s:! IfI s, <s. s:, for any s: , s; E S’. 
(3) l P(s) = Q(s) if s E S; 
l Q”(s)) = @‘(s’) if s’E S’. 
The graph G” = G 11 G’ is defined by: 
(1) S”=Sk9S’. 
(2) l s’ cs. s and s <s. s’ are false for any S’E S’ and s E S; 
l s, Cs,. s2 itI s, -Cs s2, for any s,, s2E S; 
l s; <s.s$ iff si Cs,s$, for any s;,s:ES’. 
(3) l Q”(s) = Q(s) if s E S; 
l @“(s’) = D’(s)) if S’E S’. 
The graph G” = G[ s := G’] is defined by: 
(1) s~=(s\{s})Ws’. 
(2) . s; <s,..s,, for s: E S’ and s2 E S, holds ilI s cs s,; 
l si <ss, s;, for s1 E S and s; E S’, holds iff s, cs s; 
l s, -Cs.. s2 iff s, Cs sz, for any s,, s2E S; 
l s: Cs- s; iff si (St ss, for any si, s;E S’. 
(3) l @“(sr) = @(s,) if s, E S\(s); 
l @“(s’) = @‘(s’) if S’E S’. 
A.3. Graph logic 
The syntax of J&(Z) is given by: 
where: 
l o E .9(E) (a formula of the original language); 
l 4,) qb2 E L&(E) (formulae of the extended language); 
l G is a reliability graph, i.e. a set of partially ordered sources labelled by 
formulae of L&(X). 
Its semantics is given by: 
l M k o is given by the semantics of the original language; 
l Mk=A$iff Mb4 and Ml=+; 
0 M~=T; 
0 Mkl+ iff Ml=4 is false; 
l Mb/G1 iff 36EMin(G); VSES; dom(h,)=e. 
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A.4. Properties of defaults institutions 
A default institution is: 
l weakly symmetric iff each morphism h has a reverse hR such that: 
_ if h:A+B, then hR:B+A, 
- (hR)R= h, 
- if h c h’, then hRc htR; 
l connected iff any couple of interpretations is linked by a morphism; 
l smooth iff for any graph G, for any h E Mar(G), there is a h’ sc; h with 
h’E Min( G), 
Appendix B. Proofs 
Theorem 1. Correspondences form a category for relational composition, 
Proof. Since relations form a category, it remains to prove: 
(1) A composition of correspondences is a correspondence. Let -” be the 
composition of - and --I: 
(a) -” is compatible with operators: 
a, =I ci 
=3biEsiR,ai--b,~b,--‘ci 
*f(. . a, . .) -f(. . 6,. .) ~f( . . 6;. .) -‘f(. . ci. .) 
af(. . a,. .) -“f(. . ci. .) 
(b) -” is total: 
VaEsA,3bEsB, a-bAVb3c,b--‘c 
*t/a E s,, 3c E sc-, a -“c 
(c) -” is surjective by a symmetrical argument. 
(2) For any algebra A, the identity is a correspondence between A and A. 0 
Lemma B.l. If the signature is sensible, the correspondences between two algebras 
form a complete upper lattice for componentwise inclusion. 
Proof. Given a non-empty set of correspondences -,, we have to build the smallest 
correspondence - that contains each -,. Ui-l is surjective and total, but not 
necessarily compatible. Adding the consequences of compatibility is a monotonic 
function on the complete lattice of the family of relations; it has thus a unique 
minimal fixpoint, which is the result we look for. The top of this upper lattice is 
the family of full relations between carriers, i.e. -c = A, x B,. This is a correspon- 
dence since we consider only sensible signatures, so that no carrier is empty. 0 
Lemma B.2. Surjective homomorphisms [ 171 are functional correspondences (and the 
other way around). 
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Proof. Recall that a homomorphism is a family of total functions from sA to sg that 
is compatible with operators, and that a (family of) relations is functional if for 
any element a of SAY there is at most one related element of ss (this element is 
denoted -(a)). For correspondences, it is known that -(a) indeed exists. The 
definitions are thus just identical. 0 
Theorem 2. The correspondences between two surjective algebrasform a complete lattice. 
Proof. The upper part is proved in Lemma B.l. We just have to prove the lower 
part, i.e. to construct -, the largest correspondence contained in si. ni-i is 
compatible with operators, but not total and surjective for non-surjective algebras. 
Here however, each data element of SA is represented by a term t E TgA. e;, the 
relational inverse of eA, is thus a correspondence. e:; e,, which we call the ground 
correspondence, is a correspondence by Theorem 1. We can check by induction that 
each compatible relation contains the ground correspondence, so that the bottom 
of the lattice of correspondences is indeed e:; eR. 0 
Lemma B.3. Stronger correspondences yield stronger disagreements: -, G -z 
=3 -, d -2, 
Lemma B.4. In SFOL, morphisms are agreements #they are compatible with predicates. 
Proof. By definition, a morphism - : A + B is an agreement if - G id,, for some 
identity id,. Using the definition of 5 for SFOL Va, b: a-b + p,(a) @ p,(b), 
as wanted. 0 
Lemma B.5. SFOL-agreements form a category whose objects are SFOL-interpreta- 
tions. 
Proof. Using Theorem 1, we just have to show: 
(1) The identity is an agreement between A and A, easy. 
(2) The composition of agreements is an agrement. From a -, b + 
P,(U) e p,(b) and b-, c + pe( b) e pc(c), transitivity of equivalence 
shows that U-C =C’ PA(a) ti &(c). q 
Lemma B.6. The reverse of a SFOL-agreement is a SFOL-agreement. 
Proof. By Lemma B.4. •i 
Lemma B.7. Any correspondence weaker than an agreement is an agreement. 
Proof. By Lemma B.3. 0 
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Theorem 3. If two SFOL-interpretations agree, they satisfy the same jirst-order 
formulae. 
Proof. Two valuations are related by a correspondence - if all their elements 
correspond: V- V’ B ‘tlx E X, V(x) - V’(x). Given a valuation V and a correspon- 
dence -, it is always possible to find a corresponding valuation V’ such that V - V’. 
In this case, V,(t) - V’,(t). Furthermore, if V, zx V, then the corresponding Vi zx V’. 
Let us prove A I= "f e B k v, f when V - V’ (where - is the given agreement) by 
induction: 
B+v,p(t,,...,tn) 
e Pd VXt,), . . . , Y!dtn)) 
- PA(V.(4), . . . , VA(h)) 
e A+vp(t,,...,tn); 
BkvsVv, f 
e t/v;-, V', B+v;f 
a VV,-,V, Ak,f 
@ Ai==,Vv, f; 
Bbv,fiAfi 
ti Bk,,,f, and Vkv,fi 
e Akvfi and Akvf2 
e Abvf, Afi; 
Bkvslf 
e not B/=“,f 
@ not Akvf 













Lemma B.8. In SFOL, “G” is a preorder. 
Proof. 
Reflexivity: - : A + B is less than itself using the identity as the double correspon- 
dence needed to make the comparison. 
Transitivity: For - : A+ B, 5’: A’+ B’, and -“: A”+ B”, if - s -’ (using -) and 
--‘< _)I (using -‘), then we show that -S -’ using the relational composition 
Z. z’ 0 3 . 
Lemma B.9. O-equivalence: For any SFOL-correspondence -: B+ C and SFOL- 
agreements -,:A+B and -2:C+D, -,;---=-;-2. 
Proof. We only show 5,; - - -, as the other part is symmetrical. 
(-1; - 3 -) We define the double correspondence by (b, c) = (a, c’) e a -, b A 
c = c’. If p,(b), a - 6, lpc(c), then as a -1 b we have p,(a) e p,(b) by Lemma 
B.4, so that p,(a), a -, ; - c, ~PC(C). (The case lps( b), b - c, pc. (c) is symmetrical.) 
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(-,; -s -) We define the double correspondence by (a, c) = (6, c’) e a -, b, 
b - c, c = c’. If we have a conflict p,(a), a -, ; -c, lpc (c), then all corresponding 
pairs (b, c) are such that a - 1 b, and thus p,(a) ti p,(b), from which we conclude 
p,(b), b-c, lpC(c). (The case ipa( a -,; -c, p,-(c) is symmetrical.) 0 
Lemma B.lO. Ifh E Min( T), h E S, and SG T, then h E Min(S). 
Proof. 
hEMin 
ti hETandVh’ET,h’<h Definition 
+ he T and Vh’ES, h’<h SGT 
+ hES and Vh’ES, h’Kh hES 
e hE Min(S). 0 Definition 
Lemma B.ll. If S n Int, is not empty, then Min(S) = S n Int,. 
Proof. Let h,, be some agreement in S: ho= 0. 
(3) h E Min(S) 
w hES, Vh’ES, h’<h 
3 hES, hsh, 
a hES, h=O 
H hESnInt,. 
(+) h E S n Int, 
ti hES, h=O 
=+ hES,Vh’,h’ah 
j hES,Vh’, h’sch 
+ hEMin( 0 
Definition of Min 
setting h’ = ho 
0 minimum 
0 minimum 
Lemma B.12. Min(S, u S,)c Min(S,)u Min(S,). 
Proof. 
h E Min( S, u S,) 
ti hES,u&, Vh’ES,uS,, h’sch Definition of Min 
If hESl, hE Min(S,) and if hES2, hEMin( Thus hEMin(S,)uMin(SJ. 0 
Lemma B.13. Ifhsg, hES, gg Min(S), then hE Min(S). 
Proof. By contraposition: 
h E Min(S) 
j 3h’E S, h’c h 
+ h’<g 
+ g$Min(S). q 
Definition of Min 
Transitivity 
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Lemma B.14. The class of models of a class of formulae is weakly abstract. 
Proof. A ,- B is defined as CZ(A) c Cl(B) (B has more properties). Ai= @ iff 
@ c CZ( A), so that 0 G CI( B): B is also a model of all formulae in the given class. 0 
Lemma B.15. A weakly abstract class of interpretations is closed under agreement. 
Proof. As our default institutions are required to be weakly abstract. 0 
Lemma B.16. “agrees” is an equivalence between interpretations. 
Proof. Reflexivity and transitivity are ensured by the fact that Znt, is a category; 
symmetry is obtained from O-symmetry. 0 
Lemma B.17. (Vie, 4) but (VjeJ Ej)#Vci,j,,,(Di but Ej), where K contains the 
pairs (i,j) such that d(Di,E,) is minimal among all {d(Di,Ej)(iEZ,jEJ}. (Ah 
d ( Di, E,) must be defined to apply the theorem.) 
Proof. First note that if d(D, E) is defined, h E Min(E, D) iff h E Mor(E, D) and 
h = d (0, E). By definition of but, it suffices to show that 
= IJ Min(E,, Di). 
(i,j)E K 
(2) Let h E U~i,j)EK Min(E,, Di), i.e. h E Min(E,, Di) (equivalently, h = 
d(Di, E,)) for some (i, j) E K. Assume for h the negation of the thesis, i.e. there is 
a h’E ior(Vj,, E,, ViGl D,), h’< h; then h’E Mor(E,,, D, ) for some i’ and j’. 
Consequently, d ( DiS, Ejf) G h’ < h - d ( Di, E,), contradicting that (i, j)E K. 0 
Lemma B.18. The ordering among families is a preorder. 
Proof. 
Reflexivity: From the reflexivity of the morphism order. 
Transitivity: Assume 6~ PC p, and that h, S ht for some 
that h, < ht for some u < s. 
Case 1. h,ch:. 
s. Our goal is to prove 
l h: s h: is impossible by transitivity of the morphism order. 
l h: F? ht implies the existence of a t < s such that hi < h:. Let’s take a minimal t. 
- ifh,<h:, by transitivity we have h, < h:‘; 
- if h, < hi, then we have u < t such that h, < hh . h: s hi because otherwise 
t is not minimal. By transitivity we obtain h, < hi. 
(s) Let h E Min(VjS, E,, ViS, Di); therefore h E Mor(E,, 0;) for some i and j, 
and by Lemma B.12, hE Min(E,, Di), so that h= d(Di, Ej). If d(D,, Ej) is not 
minimal, then h @ Min(VjGJ Ej, V,Et Di), contradicting our assumption. Thus h E 
Uci,j)tK Min(Ej, Di)- 
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Case 2: h, s h:. Let us take again a minimal t such that h, < hi. 
l if his h:, we use transitivity; 
l ifh:~hh,wehaveau<tsuchthath:<h::,andh,~hh:byminimalityoft. 0 
Lemma B.19. The comparison between two families 7 and f” is determined by their 
frontier, i.e. the minimal sources where_& + f :: 
(1) f’-i’ ifJ’fr(Xf’)=B; 
(2) else, 
(a) .f<.? iIT Vs Efr(_E f”), .L <f:; 
(b) i>f' z$Vs~fr(~jl.L>ft; 
(c) else, f#f’ (f and f’ are incomparable). 
Proof. We first prove (1): 
=VSES, h,$hi + 3t<,s, h,<h: and 
VSES, h,?+hh: + 3t<ss, h,>h:. 
Assume ad absurdum h, f h:. We consider the cases h, s hi and h, 9 hi separately. 
h,ghh’, 
* h,, < h:, because h’s 6’ 
* h,,*hh:, 
* &>h:, because KZ ht’, etc. 
This creates an infinite decreasing sequence in S, and this is impossible by the 
well-foundedness of S. 
For h, 3 hi, we have a symmetrical impossibility. 
(e) Obvious. 
Now we prove (2a): 
(3) Let s efr(xf’). If h Sf :, then 3t < s, fr <f :, so that s is not minimal, 
impossible. If fs s f :, then fs <f: , since f$ +f:. 
(+=) To prove fsj’ assume fY ff f:. Since S is well-founded, 3t E fr(J; f ‘), t s s. 
ft<f:, so thatf;cf: and s#t, so t<s. But we haveffj’by (1). 
The proof of (2b) is symmetrical, and (2~) is the only remaining case. 0 
Lemma B.20. If G= G1/G2, then 6’cGL if (pJG,cG,KIG, or plc,=G,KIG, and 
a?, <CT* f&3,). 
Proof. As p <G h’, by Lemma B.19 there is a non-empty frontier fr G S such that 
Vs E fr, hi < h,. As every node of S is in some S,, there is an S, such that fr n Si # 0. 
The frontier cannot be partly in both graphs: if we assume that there are s E fr n G, 
and S’E fr n G2, we have s’ CC, s contradicting our definition of frontier as minimal 
sources. If the frontier is in the lower graph, we have QIG, =c~, fil,,; if it is in the 
upper graph, we have PI G,=G,&, and ~lc,<G2&z. 0 
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Lemma B.21. IfG= G111G2, then 6’<,K iff PI,, <(;,KIG, for some iE {I, 2} 
Proof. As p cG h’, by Lemma B.19 there is a non-empty frontier jir c S such that 
t/s E fr, hj < h,. As every node of S is in some Si, there is an Si such that fr n S, # (d. 
Assume there is an s~fr~ (the frontier for Gi) that does not belong to fr. Since G 
is well-founded there is an s’< s, S’E fr. But if s’< s then S’E Si, so that s &Sri. Thus 
frz=frnSi. 0 
Theorem 4. If DHE, then G[s:= E]#G[s:= D]. 
Proof. Immediate, since the semantics of graphs only considers the models of the 
component formulae. q 





e ek= D by closure. q 
Theorem 6. et=D but E ifSeb D/E 
Proof. 
(+) If there is a minimal morphism h for D but E, we can extend it to a pair 
f = (id,, h), which is minimal for the lexicographic ordering. 
(+) Let us call sg the source of E, and s1 the source of D. If E is unsatisfiable, 
then there are no morphisms of codomain e, and therefore no models, as in D but 
E. If E has a model, its identity is less than any other morphism, so that a pair can 
only be minimal if its s0 component has null distance. Therefore its domain e agrees 
with its codomain (a model of E), that is e is a model of E by closure of E. 0 
Theorem 7. G/E k E. 
Proof. Let e be a model of G/E; there is thus a minimal family h’, with h, : e + d,. 
Let 0 be the minimum source of G/E, and let 6’ be as h’ (s # 0 =+ hi = h,), except 
for 0: h; = id,. ps 6, since h: s h,. If 6’< h’, then h would not be minimal, contradict- 
ing our hypothesis, so that 6’~ h’ and thus h&= h,, which means that h, is an 
agreement, and thus ek= E by closure. q 
Theorem 8. In a connected institution, GJG,l= G,. 
Proof. If one of the formulae of G = G2/G, has no model, then G has no model 
and the property is vacuously true. Else, if ek= G, there is a minimal family h’ of 
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domain e, thus all p of domain e’ are not smaller; thus the part relative to G, (PIG,) 
is not smaller than Llc,. Now for any f’, the family of morphisms for G, is of the 
form h’lG,, because we can complete f’ by taking for each s2 E G, a morphism 
(whose existence is guaranteed by connectedness) from e’ to a model of G,, (whose 
existence is assumed in this case of the proof). 0 
Theorem 9. G1/(G2(k G,/G2. 
Proof. Let ei= G1/IG2(, which means ALE Min(G,/IG,[), dom(fi) = e. Let sg be the 
minimum source, whose formula is IG21. By Theorem 7, h, is an agreement, so that 
e F Gz, which means 3h; E Min( GJ, dom(h;) = e. It suffices now to prove that 
Ll,,/h; E Min( G,/G,) to obtain the desired result, since dom(LICl/h;) = e. Assume 
ad absurdum that there exists p < Lla,/h;, with h’ E Mor( G,/ G2). By Lemma B.20, 
either /?‘lG2 < h;, which would contradict &E Min(G,); or Kl,, < plcl, so that 
~]c;,lidd,,(~~) < ij,,/id, = h, contradicting h E Min(G,/IG,I). 0 
Theorem 10. If G is satis-able, each G, is satisjiable. 
Proof. By contraposition, if some G, is unsatisfiable, then we are unable to construct 
a morphism (and thus a family of morphisms) to one of its models. Cl 
Theorem 11. If AXES G, is satisfiable, then G#/jSis G,. 
Proof. 
(*I If ebA\,,s G,, then ih, is a minimum (and thus minimal) family showing 
that .e F G. 
(+) There is a model eF /\SES G,. As the family of morphisms Fd, is minimum, 
every other minimal family is a family of agreements, and thus any model of G 
satisfies each G, by closure, and thus their conjunction, 0 
Theorem 12. In a smooth institution, if G k E, then G/E # G. 
Proof. 
(*I ei= G/E 
e 3h E Min(G/E), dam(h) = e 
3 hlc E Mar(G). 
Assume hlG & Min(G). Then 
3h’cGhlG, h’E Min(G) 
=+ dom(h’) = e’!= E 
3 h’lid,. < h 
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(*I el=G 
=$ ef=E 
+ 3h E Min(G), dam(h) = e 
=t~ h/id, E Mor( G/E). 
Assume h/id, & Min( G/ E). Then 
3h’< h/id,, h’c Mor(G/E) 
=+ h’j,<h 
+ hEMin( 0 
hypothesis 
Definition 6 
Theorem 13. (G[s:=(CvD)](k(G[s:=C](v(G[s:=D](. 
Proof. 
eklG[s:=(CvD)]l 
e 3K:e+d,EMin(G[s:=(CvD)]) Definition 6 
Either & k C and then CE Min( G[s := C]) by Lemma B.12, or d,< I= D, and thus 
h E Min (G[ s := D]) symmetrically. 0 
Theorem 14. IG,IE,~AIG~/E~~~((G,IIG~)I(E,~E~)(. 
Proof. 
e+ IG,/E,I A IGd& 
+ 3h, E Min(G,/E,), dom(h,) = e A 
3h,E Min(G2/E2), dom(h,) = e Definition 6 
Let h =(hI~~,IIh&Ji&. Th en h E Mor((GrII GJl(% A &)I. 
Assume ad absurdum that h is not minimal, i.e. h’< h. By Lemma B.19 there is a 
non-empty frontier fr such that Vs Efr hi < h,. 
l The source of E, A E2 cannot be in the frontier, since identities are minimal. 
l By Lemma B.21, if the frontier intersects with S, then h’lG, < h,lc,, and thus 
h’l G,IE, < h,, contradicting the minimality of h,. 
l Symmetrically for S,. 0 
Lemma B.22. (G/D[A (G/E(+(G/(DA E)(. 
Proof. Let e be a model of G/D and G/E. There are thus two minimal families 
of morphisms h’ and p of domain e for G/D and G/E respectively. By reasoning 
in a similar way as in the proof of Theorem 14, we have h E Min( G/( D A E)). 0 
Lemma B.23. IGI A Eb lG/EI. 
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Proof. 
et=lGIAE 
j 36:e+d,cMin(G)AebE Definition 
+ V~‘E Mor(G/E), h’K(h/id,) Lemma B.20 
+ L/id,EMin(G/E) + eklG/El. 0 
Theorem 15. If a graph H has more edges than G, then it has less models: H k G. 
Proof. First note that adding edges reduces the frontier between two families: 
fiH (f,f’) ~fi~(f;f’) but cannot void it due to well-foundedness: 
fil&f’)f0 * .h(f;f’)#O. 
Consequently, if two families are equivalent, strictly better, or strictly worse for G, 
they will still be for H. If two families are incomparable, they cannot become 
equivalent. Here, we only need that f’cG f + f’cHj Thus, if a family is minimal 
for H (f~ Min(H), i.e. af)~ Mar(H), f’<&) it is also minimal for G. 0 
Corollary 1. (S) (4 but +,) =EJ $. 
Proof. By Theorem 7. 0 
Corollary 2. (Wl) From $ =+ 4, infer (Cc, but 4) e I,!J. 
Proof. If I++ is satisfiable, by Theorem 11 we have $ but 4#$ A 4W $. If $ is not 
satisfiable, by Theorem 10 we have $ but 4 #I# I,!L 0 
Corollary 3. (Orl) (($, v &) but 4) + ($, but 4) v (I)* but 4). 
Proof. By Theorem 13. Cl 
Corollary 4. (K7) (4 but 4) A & + Cc, but ( C$ A &). 
Proof. By Theorem 14. 0 
Corollary 5. (Tl) ($ but T) e $. 
Proof. Since I/J =9 T, we have by (Wl) (II, but T) + I,!A 0 
Corollary 6. (Or2) + but (4 v &) + (Cc, but 4) v (Cc, but +*). 
Proof. Using (K7) with 4 = (Y v p twice; first with & = CY, then, with & = p: 
($ but (cYv/~))A~ + ($ but (Y), 
(4 but (~vP))AP =+ (Ic, butp). 
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The disjunction of the antecedents is 
(((cr but (avP))~a)v((G hut (avP))r\P), 
which distributes into ($ but (avp))r\(avp). Since (4 but (&v/3)) + (~vVp) 
by (S), we obtain (I,!J but (cx v p)) + (I,!J but a) v ($ but p), as desired. 0 
Corollary 7. (K3) ($ A 4) + (I,!J but 4). 
Proof. Take (K7) with 4 = T, i.e. (I/J but T) A & + $ but (T A &). By (Tl), we 
obtain ((cr A &) + ($ but c,Q. 0 
Corollary 8. (T2) (T but $) e I/L 
Proof. By (K3) we have (T A t,!~) =3 (T but +); and by (S) we obtain (T but I,!J) 
*CL. 0 
Corollary 9. (ID) (I) but I+!J) e I,!L 
Proof. By (Wl). 0 
Corollary 10. (ID2) (( + but 4) but 4) GJ (+ but 4). 
Proof. By (Wl) and (S). Cl 
Corollary 11. (W2) From q5 a I,!J, infer (t,b but 4) e 4. 
Proof. From 4 3 Ic, we deduce 4 e Cc, A 4 and by (K3) (r,!~ A $) + ($ but 4) 
so that q5 3 (I,!J but 4). On the other hand, (S) gives ( I,!J but 4) 3 I$. Cl 
Corollary 12. (Fl) ((cr but I) e 1. 
Proof. By (W2). 0 
Corollary 13. (F2) (I but $) ti 1. 
Proof. By (Wl). 0 
Corollary 14. (HL) $ but c$ =+ ($ v (t+h but 4)) A 4. 
Proof. its clausal form is (($ but 4) + 4) A (($ A d) =3 (I,!J but +)), which is 
proved by (S) and (K3). 0 
Corollary 15. (El) i(+ but 4) + (irC,vi@). 
Proof. The contrapositive of (K3). 0 
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Corollary 16. (11) From 11) infer l(t,b but 4). 
Proof. 14 is $ (j I; (I/J but $) e (I but 4) by Theorem 4; and (I but 4) 
e I by (F2). 0 
Corollary 17. (12) From ~4 infer ~(4 but 4). 
Proof. The proof is symmetrical to that of Corollary 16. 0 
Corollary 18. (And) ($ but 4) A (I/J but &) + $ but (4 A &). 
Proof. From (S), we have ($ but &) + &. Therefore 
($ but 4) A (rCr but 42) * (Icr but 4) A 42, 
and (K7) is ($ but 4) A & =2 I,!J but (4 A &), giving the result by transitivity. 0 
Corollary 19. (COl) From t,b v (cIz infer ($ but 4) v (I,!J~ but 4) e 4. 
Proof. From $ v & yield ($ v &) = T, so that by (T2), we have (($ v &) but 4) 
e 4. By (Orl), we have 4 =+ (((cl but 4) v (I/J~ but 4)). On the other hand, by 
using (S) twice, we obtain (( $ but 4) v ( (CT2 but 4)) + 4. Cl 
Corollary 20. (Nl) (Ic, but 4) v (l$ but 4) e 4. 
Proof. By (COl). 0 
Corollary 21. (C02) From C#J v & infer +!J =3 ((I/J but 4) v (I,!J but &)). 
Proof. Symmetric to the first part of (COl). 0 
Corollary 22. (N2) + 3 (( IJ but 4) v (II, but 14)). 
Proof. By (C02). 0 
Corollary 23. From ($ but 4) =+ & and (q!~ but (4 A c#Q)) =2 &, infer (+ but r$) 
* 43. 
Proof. Using (K7). 0 
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